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Abstract: This review explores social science analyses of diagnosis of childhood 
neurological disabilities. The paper moves through three sections, which capture the 
historical and conceptual trends within the literature. The first focuses on work 
identifying the need to communicate effectively with parents when giving a diagnosis, 
the second explores the role parents can play as ‘partners’ or contributors to diagnosis, 
the final goes further in exploring the social complexity of diagnoses in order to 
examine the embedded nature of social practices, power relations and hierarchies and 
institutions in the diagnosis encounter. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Introduction 
There is a long tradition of exploring the institutions and actors within medicine in the 
social sciences (1). In the 1970s medical sociology focused on macro analyses, on 
medicine as an institution with an embedded position in society that allowed it to 
exercise power over patients (2). Increasingly, influenced by broader shifts towards 
social constructionism, medical sociology has narrowed its interest to the micro and 
the everyday construction of medical knowledge and power (3). This historical trend 
within medical sociology has altered the way in which key themes are analysed. No 
more so can this be seen than within critiques of medical professional power. Macro 
level analyses of the power of medical professional organisations now sit alongside 
micro accounts of the individual interactions between professionals and patients (4). 
 
The move from the macro to the micro can be seen in one of the newer social science 
disciplines, disability studies has developed out of and retained the political 
motivations and perspective of the disability movement (5). Within disability studies 
the following ‘social model’ distinction between impairment and disability is made: 
 
Impairment is the functional limitation within the individual caused by physical, 
mental or sensory impairment. Disability is the loss or limitation of opportunities 
to take part in the normal life of the community on an equal level with others due 
to physical and social barriers. (6:2) 
 
This understanding of disability is in contrast to the ‘medical model’ which presents 
disability as an individual pathology (7). From this perspective to have a disabled 
child is a tragedy that equals a life of burden and restriction (for the family as well as 
the child) and should be avoided if at all possible (for example through antenatal 
screening and termination) (8). When the social model started being used to 
understand the position of disabled people it tended to concentrate on macro level 
analyses of institutional power, more recently micro concerns have moved into focus. 
In particular disability studies writers influenced by social constructionist approaches 
are interested in the role of professional frameworks for understanding the body, 
illness and medicine in the social construction of disability and impairment (9).   
 
A particular focus of medical sociology and disability studies is the area of children 
with disabilities, as patients they raise specific issues within medicine and the social 
processes that surround it. For example, the interaction is between professional, 
patient and parent, complicating the relationships that inform intervention. This paper 
concentrates on childhood neurological disabilities as the role of developmental 
markers in their diagnosis brings social considerations to the fore. The paper moves 
through three sections; the order of the sections indicates a critical continuum from 
work that identifies the need to communicate effectively with parents when giving a 
diagnosis, to analyses exploring the role parents can play as ‘partners’, to finally work 
exploring the embedded nature of social practices, relations and institutions in the 
diagnosis encounter. The discussion follows both a historical trend and also is 
structured to indicate the distinct levels of analyses being developed by social 
scientists.  
 
Each section critically engages with the work discussed and concludes with 
recommendations for changing medical practice that emerge from them.  
 
Communicating Diagnosis 
How diagnosis is communicated to parents is a well established area of social science 
concern. This work began in healthcare studies that identified unnecessary trauma 
when parents are told that a baby has a condition such as cerebral palsy (10, 11). For 
example, Cunningham et.al. (12) studied how Down’s syndrome was reported to 
parents and found that they were presented with a picture of struggle and grief, which 
inhibited their ability to cope and respond to their baby over the long term.  
 
More recently Cunningham has identified 3 main areas of dissatisfaction amongst 
parents: 
 
1. The manner of the person giving the diagnosis, for example, 
unsympathetic, cold, insensitive, expressed in language too difficult or 
vague to understand. 
2. Problems with information, for example, lack of information and 
guidance about the diagnosis and what can be done… 
3. Organisational aspects – delay and difficulty in getting access to help, 
lack of privacy, lack of co-ordination between services. (13: 86) 
 
Cunningham asserts that the grief parents are said to experience when a diagnosis is 
given is not solely down to the news itself, but a product of the processes they go 
through, if ‘the teller assumes the news is ‘bad’ and needs to be ‘broken’ it denotes a 
negative conception which is likely to be imparted on the parent’ (original emphasis, 
13: 87). From within disability studies, as indicated above, the claim is that medical 
approaches to diagnosis and disability generate an overly pathological approach to 
communication that confirms for parents that this indeed is a truly awful thing that is 
happening to them and their child. It is something which signifies no future or quality 
of life for their child or for their family (14).  
 
Tates et.al. (15) argue that a poor relationship and lack of communication between 
doctors and parents can hamper diagnosis as symptoms are missed. In addition, poor 
communication during initial diagnosis can leave a legacy of mistrust and anger that 
influences future relationships between parents and the range of health and social care 
professionals they come in contact with. Therefore, initial diagnosis and its discussion 
with parents are fundamentally important. They should frame the child’s condition in 
a way that is honest and comprehensive but acknowledges the child’s human qualities 
and is still open to possible futures. 
 
From the criticisms indicated above, recommendations for change in practice have 
developed. Developing a relationship with the parents that is grounded in a sensitive 
model of communication is vital in the area of childhood disability as parents play a 
role as intermediaries, discussing symptoms and issues with doctors. A wide ranging 
literature identifies the principles medical actors can follow to present news in a way 
that is more sensitive (16). Mitchell and Sloper (17) stress the need to provide parents 
with information, in everyday language, which they can use to comprehend the 
implication of the diagnosis for their child. Communication should be culturally 
sensitive and involve jargon free explanations (18). In practical terms Cunningham 
(13) offers some very specific advice. Parents should be told as soon as possible after 
a diagnosis. Parents should be told together and/or with family and/or friends present. 
The diagnosis should happen in a private space. Every effort should be made to 
ensure that the baby or child is present. Beforehand the person passing on the news 
should ensure there is enough time to do so. A colleague should also be present to 
help answer questions. Before the parents leave a follow up interview should be 
arranged for twenty four to forty eight hours later. They should leave with written 
information, which they can read when ready to do so. Finally, after the meeting is 
over the parents should remain in a private space with their child to reflect on what 
they have been told. 
 
Cottrell and Summers (19) usefully focus on the issues that emerge, as is often the 
case within neurological problems, when diagnosis is a question of comparison to 
developmental markers of normal progression. In such contexts, the issues of 
communication and what parents need to be informed of is both more difficult and 
more vital (20). They argue that the tendency is to hold back suspicions until 
something is known for certain, the cost is that parents are left in limbo. In this 
context, Cottrell and Summers advocate sharing concerns with parents in similar ways 
to those advocated by Cunningham. They also point out that a diagnosis is not the 
conclusion for parents, but the beginning of a journey that will continue throughout 
their child’s life. Cunningham argues that the journey involves ‘cognitive re-
construction’ (13: 94), where parents swap the child dreamed of for their child and a 
new narrative for their future is written. Professionals can help that re-construction by 
providing resources and support that are honest but expansive. 
 
It is the literature summarised in this section that is beginning to have the most impact 
on medical practice, much work is being done – at least at the level of policy and 
education – to consider better methods for communicating diagnoses to parents and 
children. This is an important first step, but it does not go far enough in incorporating 
parents into diagnosis. What we have so far is how to tell parents what medical 
professionals have concluded; this can be taken further by considering what role 
parents can play not just as recipients but also as participants in diagnosis. 
 
Partners in Diagnosis 
Work discussing a larger role for parents is influenced by wider debates in medical 
sociology regarding the knowledge patients can bring to the medical encounter, which 
means that they ‘are experts in the detail of everyday life’ (21: 47). A continuum 
exists whereby some writers suggest that this expertise indicates that patients can play 
some part in diagnosis, to others who argue that patients can be full or equal 
participants in the diagnostic encounter (22). Two such writers are Arksey and Sloper 
who argue that diagnosis is a form of ‘active interpretative work’ (23: 484) that 
patients participate in. Elsewhere Arksey goes further to propose that patients can be 
‘lay epidemiologists’ (24: 462), a claim that is not without challenge for denying the 
varied levels of expertise lay people and clinicians bring to a clinical encounter (21).  
 
Avdi et.al. (25) take Arksey’s ideas into the realm of childhood disability to assert that 
partnership reflects recognition that parents have some ‘expertise’ about their child 
(26). This expertise emerges from the intimacy of their familial relationship. 
Acknowledging this intimate expertise does not necessarily deny the expertise of the 
medical professionals, Avdi et.al. describe parents as ‘experts… in need of expert 
input’ (25: 331). Rigazio-DiGilio (27) explores a ‘relational’ model of diagnoses that 
incorporates an awareness of the ‘meaning-making processes’ (27: 1024) that will 
enable families to work through diagnosis in a way that is manageable for them. 
Working in such a way requires a framework that does not judge parental reaction 
against templates of how they should react, which can label a ‘family’s familiar ways 
of perceiving and acting as substandard or deviant’ (27: 1024).    
 
Drawing parents into the diagnosis as participants includes considering the references 
through which they draw meaning in the diagnostic encounter (28). Diagnosis does 
not occur in a social vacuum, both medical professionals and parents bring with them 
existing discourses of disability that influence the way in which they discuss and 
frame a diagnosis. Work within social anthropology has been particularly useful in 
this respect. Two particularly excellent examples of this research are by Larson (29) 
and Landsman (30). Both Larson and Landsman examine how mothers made sense of 
the diagnosis their child received and acted in ways considered problematic by 
doctors. Larson argues that parents are judged against a template for how they should 
behave and respond. Mothers should accept the diagnosis and display the obvious 
grief over the loss of their perfect child, if not they are in denial.  
In Landsman’s research the focus is drawn outwards to include awareness of the 
surrounding discourses that influence individual meanings. Such discourses include 
the medical model of disability as a personal tragedy inflicted on people, and popular 
culture celebrations of the personal triumph of individuals who have ‘overcome’ their 
‘infliction’. Each of these narratives is based on a normalising ideology that assumes 
that to be disabled is to be ‘outside the range of human acceptability’ (30: 1950). 
Landsman argues that these discourses influence the way in which mothers explore 
the significance of diagnosis for their child, for example seeking to challenge 
professional definitions of diagnosis as certain, in order to hold open the possibility of 
heroic progress and a return to normality.  
 
The recommendations for changing practice that emerge from this work stress the 
need to allow patients or their representatives a role in developing diagnosis and 
treatment. This does not necessarily suggest an equal role, but implies that knowledge 
from everyday life has a role in the diagnostic and treatment encounter. It also points 
to an acknowledgment by medical professionals of the ambiguity and contingent 
quality to the diagnoses they make, particularly where such diagnoses are made 
against developmental markers. This requires an honesty that diagnosis may be open 
to change as the child develops (and is supported). Such changes can benefit medicine 
by challenging the hierarchical models of medical practice that make it difficult for 
parents to speak for their children and challenge unnecessarily bleak forecasts for 
what the future holds. 
 
The work above has taken us further in exploring the ways in which parents (although 
in some of the studies such as Landsman and Larson the focus only on mothers 
perpetuates the assumption that it is mothers who are the primary carers of children) 
can play a part in diagnosis and how their approach to diagnosis is influenced by the 
world around them. However, we need to remain very conscious of the embedded 
position of medical professionals to construct the processes through which parents 
move through and how such a position shapes and at times dictates the meanings 
developed in interactions. There are various ways in which social science examines 
the embedded power of medical professionals, one includes going further in 
deconstructing the diagnosis to consider the ways in which medical conditions are 
socially produced by medical practice. 
 Deconstructing Diagnosis 
There is now a significant body of work examining the social and political complexity 
involved in defining new medical conditions and producing the criteria that fix the 
condition in the diagnosis encounter. Some of this work links back into sociological 
work examining the power and significance of labelling social problems (31). This 
work has been taken up by disability studies as a way of understanding the power of 
the medical model (32). The claim is that what makes an impairment a disability is the 
medical framework used by professionals to name and label it (9). 
This perspective is finding its way into contemporary analyses of childhood 
disabilities such as autism and ADHD (33). Two examples are those of Rosenberg 
(34) and Molloy and Vasil (35). Rosenberg takes a historical approach to examine the 
growth of medical explanations towards variation in childhood behaviour and other 
areas of human life. He places the individual diagnostic encounter in a context of 
medical frameworks and bureaucratic institutions that shape the reading of human 
variation within the structures of medical diagnostic criteria and treatment. Attention 
deficit disorder has served to ‘naturalize and legitimate conceptions of difference and 
deviance’ (34: 251). The disease category provides a framework for ‘assimilating the 
incoherence and arbitrariness of human experience to the larger system of institutions, 
relationships, and meanings in which we all exist as social beings’ (34: 257). 
Molloy and Vasil (35) explore the development of Asperger Syndrome as a diagnostic 
category. Their argument is that what was once seen as ‘normal’ variation in 
neurological development in children is now labelled as a medical condition through 
the production of diagnostic criteria within the Asperger category. Once this category 
is attached to a child those around him or her ‘view the child’s behaviour as 
symptoms rather than as expressions of his or her unique personality’ (35: 661). Their 
central argument is that without a set of diagnostic markers Asperger Syndrome does 
not exist. Once it does it becomes a label through which children are classified as 
normal or abnormal in their development. Therefore ‘AS is never simply located 
within the individual: no gene or discovery of different neurological ‘wiring’ 
arrangements will wholly explain AS’ (35: 665).  
The next question is what lies behind the ‘discovery’ of particular conditions at 
particular points in time? From a sociological perspective the answer does not lie in 
the medical lab, rather it is linked to particular social, economic and political 
conditions that help produce the quest for knowledge (36). Hedgecoe (37) examines 
changes in definitions of Cystic Fibrosis in order to argue that the criteria have shifted 
from a series of symptoms towards identification of a genetic marker. His account 
concentrates ‘on the discursive mechanics of knowledge production – how a 
particular position is made convincing’ (37: 54). Conrad and Potter (38) examine how 
ADHD in the U.S. has moved from a childhood condition to one now being identified 
amongst adults and argue that: 
New diagnoses rarely emerge simply as a result of new scientific discoveries. 
Medicalization studies have demonstrated that agents such as self-help and 
advocacy groups, social movements, health-related organizations, 
pharmaceutical companies, academic researchers, and clinicians can be central 
in creating specific diagnosis. (38: 560) 
Like Arskey and others (39, 40) Conrad and Potter are interested in the role patients 
as individuals or through representatives (parents) or collectively (support groups) 
play in the medicalisation of social problems through advocating a medical 
explanation for their difficulties. Patients or the parents of patients may seek 
definitive diagnosis in the hope that it will provide a gateway towards medical and 
social service support and redefine their child from being a ‘problem’ child towards 
being a child with a particular legitimate condition. Nevertheless as disability studies 
points out this has also the implication of placing a medical explanation and solution 
at the centre of understanding the differences from ‘normal’ behaviour their child 
presents. The work by Conrad and Potter is significant as it challenges the assumption 
made in some disability studies accounts, for example Molloy and Vasil, that only 
professionals have the power to label and name. That being said Conrad and Potter do 
acknowledge that patients only become successful in labelling their condition in the 
way they wish when it is supported by medical actors who take forward the assertion 
and stabilise it in a set of diagnostic criteria.  
 
Recommendations that can emerge from the work in this section are probably the 
most thought provoking and difficult for medical practitioners to contemplate. 
However, in some ways this is not true as clinicians are often more aware of the 
degree to which the categories and criteria within which they work are socially 
produced than social scientists give them credit for. The work here points to a wider 
responsibility amongst various professional and institutional actors involved in the 
treatment of children with disabilities, particularly in cases such as autistic spectrum 
disorder, to think through the social ramifications of the label that comes with 
diagnosis and to guard against viewing a child only through the medical meanings 
that such a diagnosis generates. It points also to wider social responsibility to consider 
how we treat and stigmatise those, however young, who act and behave differently, 
whether in the classroom, playgroup or supermarket and whether understanding such 
children through the medical model is the only way in which we can comprehend and 
help them. 
  
Conclusion 
A range of social science perspectives are examining the social and human 
dimensions of diagnosis. There is further work and perspectives (for example within 
psychology) than can be summarised here. The work that has been summarised points 
to both practical issues about everyday practice and also wider critical questions about 
how we think about and approach the meaning and processes contained within 
diagnosis. What the work seeks to capture is the depth and ambiguity involved in 
diagnostic journeys.  
Sponsor 
Dr Mclaughlin is currently working on an Economic and Social Science Research 
Council Project ‘Parents, Professionals and Disabled Babies: Identifying Enabling 
Care’ (REF RES000230129) with Dr Emma Clavering (University of Newcastle), Dr 
Dan Goodley (University of Sheffield) and Dr Claire Tregaskis (University of 
Sheffield). The ideas summarised in this review are being further explored through 
ethnographic work with a group of parents with babies and very young children who 
have been diagnosed with some form of disability.  
Bibliography 
1. Aronowitz RA. Making sense of illness: science, society, and disease. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press; 1998.  
2. Tuckett D, Kaufert JM, eds. Basic readings in medical sociology. London: Tavistock 
Publications; 1978.  
3. Bury M. Social Constructionism and the Development of Medical Sociology. Sociology of 
Health & Illness. 1986;8:137-169. 
4. Friedson 
5. Barnes, C., Oliver, M., Barton, L, eds. Disability studies today. Cambridge: Polity Press in 
association with Blackwell Publishers, 2002. 
6. Barnes, C. (1991) Disabled people in Britain and discrimination: A case for anti-
discrimination, London: Hurst&Co.  
7. Oliver M. Defining Impairment and Disability: Issues at Stake. In: Barnes C, Mercer G, eds. 
Exploring the Divide: Illness and Disability. Leeds: The Disability Press; 1996:39-54. 
8. UPIAS. Fundamental Principles of Disability. London: Union of the Physically Impaired 
Against Segregation; 1976. 
9. Goodley D. 'Learning Difficulties', the Social Model of Disability and Impairment: 
Challenging Epistemologies. Disability and Society. 2001;16:207-231.  
10. Kerr SM, McIntosh JB. Disclosure of Disability: Exploring the Perspective of Parents. 
Midwifery. 1998;14:225-232. 
11. Williams C, Alderson P, Farsides B. What constitutes 'balanced information in the 
practitioners' portrayals of Down's syndrome? Midwifery. 2002;18:230-237. 
12. Cunningham CC, Morgan PA, McGucken RB. Down's syndrome: Is Dissatisfaction with 
Disclosure of Diagnosis Inevitable. Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology. 
1984;26:33-39. 
13. Cunningham CC. Telling Parents their Child has a Disability. In: Mittler P, Mittler H, eds. 
Innovations in Family Support for People with Learning Disabilities. Whittle-le-Woods: 
Lisieux Hall; 1994. 
14. Bartolo PA. Communicating a Diagnosis of Developmental Disability to Parents: 
Multiprofessional Negotiation Frameworks. Child: Care, Health and Development. 
2002;28:65-71. 
15. Tates K, Elbers E, Meeuwesen L, Bensing J. Doctor-parent-child relationships: a 'pas de 
trois'. Patient Education and Counseling. 2002;48:5-14. 
16. Hatton C, Akram Y, Robertson JA, Shah R, Emerson E. The Disclosure Process and its 
Impact on South Asian Families with a Child with Severe Intellectual Disabilities. Journal of 
Applied Research in Intellectual Disabilities. 2003;16:177-188. 
17. Mitchell W, Sloper P. A Guide to Good Practice. London: Joseph Rowntree Foundation; 
2000. 
18. Quine L, Pahl J. First Diagnosis of Severe Handicap: A Study of Parental Reactions. 
Developmental Medicine and Child Neurology. 1987;29:232-242. 
19. Cottrell DJ, Summers K. Communicating an Evolutionary Diagnosis of Disability to Parents. 
Child: Care, Health and Development. 1990;16:211-218.  
20. Cowen A. Taking Care?: The Family Fund Trust; 2002. 
21. Prior L. Belief, knowledge and expertise: the emergence of the lay expert in medical 
sociology. Sociology of Health & Illness. 2003;25:41-57.  
22. Williems D. Susan's Breathlessness. The Construction of Professionals and Laypersons. In: 
Lachmund J, Stollberg G, eds. The Social Construction of Illness. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner; 
1992:105-114. 
23. Arksey H, Sloper P. Disputed diagnoses: the cases of RSI and childhood cancer. Social 
Science & Medicine. 1999;49:483-497. 
24. Arksey H. Expert and Lay Participation in the Construction of Medical Knowledge. 
Sociology of Health & Illness. 1994;16:448-468. 
25. Avdi E, Griffin C, Brough S. Parents' constructions of professional knowledge, expertise and 
authority during assessment and diagnosis of their child for an autistic spectrum disorder. 
British Journal of Medical Psychology. 2000;73:327-338. 
26. Steihaug S, Malterud K. Part process analysis: a qualitative method for studying provider-
patient interaction. Scandinavian Journal of Public Health. 2003;31:107-112. 
27. Rigazio-DiGilio SA. Relational diagnosis: A co-constructive-developmental perspective on 
assessment and treatment. Journal of Clinical Psychology. 2000;56:1017-1036. 
28. Good M, Good B, Munakato T, Koyabayashi Y, Mattingly C. Oncology and Narrative Time. 
Social Science & Medicine. 1994;38:855-862.  
29. Larson E. Reframing the Meaning of Disability to Families: The Embrace of Paradox. Social 
Science & Medicine. 1998;47:865-875. 
30. Landsman G. Emplotting children's lives: developmental delay vs. disability. Social Science 
& Medicine. 2003;56:1947-1960. 
31. Lupton D. The Imperative of Health. London: Sage; 1995. 
32. Oliver M. Understanding disability. Basingstoke: Macmillan; 1996. 
33. Gill VT, Maynard DW. On 'Labelling' in Actual Interactrion: Delivering and Receiving 
Diagnosis of Developmental Disabilities. Social Problems. 1995;42:11-37. 
34. Rosenberg C. The Tyranny of Diagnosis: Specific Entities and Individual Experience. The 
Milbank Quarterly. 2002;80:237-260.  
35. Molloy H, Vasil L. The social construction of Asperger syndrome: the pathologising of 
difference? Disability & Society. 2002;17:659-669. 
36. Bickenbach JE, Somnath C, Badley EM, Ustun TB. Models of Disablement, Universalism 
and the International Classification of Impairments, Disabilities and Handicaps. Social 
Science and Medicine. 1999;48:1173-1187. 
37. Hedgecoe AM. Expansion and uncertainty: cystic fibrosis, classification and genetics. 
Sociology of Health & Illness. 2003;25:50-70.  
38. Conrad P, Potter D. From hyperactive children to ADHD adults: Observations on the 
expansion of medical categories. Social Problems. 2000;47:559-582. 
39. Armstrong EM. Diagnosing moral disorder: The discovery and evolution of fetal alcohol 
syndrome. Social Science & Medicine. 1998;47:2025-2042.  
40. Brown P. Naming and Framing: The Social Construction of Diagnosis and Illness. Journal of 
Health and Social Behaviour. 1995;extra issue:34-52. 
 
